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Efficient HMAC-based Secure Communication for
VANETs
Changhui Hu, Tat Wing Chim, S.M. Yiu, Lucas C.K.Hui, and Victor O.K. Li
Abstract—Vehicular ad hoc network (VANET) is an
emerging type of network which facilitates vehicles on roads
to communicate for driving safety. It requires a mechanism
to help authenticate messages, identify valid vehicles, and
remove malevolent vehicles which do not obey the rules.
Most existing solutions either do not have an effective mes-
sage verification scheme , or use the Public Key Infrastruc-
ture (PKI). In this network, vehicles are able to broadcast
messages to other vehicles and a group of known vehicles
can also communicate securely among themselves. So group
communication is necessary for the network. However, most
existing solutions either do not consider this or use pairing
operation to realize this. They are either not secure or
not effective. In this paper, we provide a more comprehen-
sive set of secure schemes with Hash-based Message Au-
thentication Code(HMAC) in VANETs to overcome their
shortcomings. Of course, we still need to use Pairing op-
eration in some place. Our scheme is composed of three
schemes: (1)Communications between Vehicles and Road-
Side Units(RSU) (2)One to One Communications within a
Group (3)One to One Communications without a Group.
Based on our simulation study, we show that our schemes
are effective and the delay caused is much lower. The aver-
age delay caused by our first scheme is nearly thousands of
times lower than prior schemes. The average delay caused
by our second scheme is 0.312ms, while the delay caused
by prior scheme is 12.3ms. Meanwhile the average delay
caused by our third scheme is 0.312ms, and the delay caused
by prior scheme is about 9s.
Index Terms—Secure vehicular sensor network, authenti-
cation, group communication, HMAC, symmetric cryptog-
raphy
I. Introduction
Vehicular Ad Hoc Network (VANET) has been attract-
ing more and more attentions from both industry and
academia. It is a critical component of the Intelligent
Transportation Systems (ITSs) [6] which aims at enhanc-
ing driving safety through inter-vehicle communications or
communications with roadside infrastructure. In a typi-
cal VANET, each vehicle is assumed to have an on-board
unit (OBU) and there are road-side units (RSU) installed
along the roads. A trusted authority (TA) and maybe
some other application servers are installed in the back-
bone. The OBUs and RSUs communicate using the Ded-
icated Short Range Communications (DSRC) protocol [7]
over the wireless channel while the RSUs, TA, and the
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application servers communicate using a secure fixed net-
work. Based on this, each vehicle can periodically broad-
cast safety information [8] containing its current speed, lo-
cation, road condition and traffic accident information, etc.
every 100-300 ms. With the received information, other
drivers can make an early response in case of exceptional
situations. With multi-hop forwarding, the messages will
be either terminated by an RSU or dropped when exceed-
ing their lifetimes. The RSU may also inform the traffic
control center to adjust traffic lights for avoiding possible
traffic congestion. VANET also provides a platform for a
group of known vehicles (e.g. police chasing a bank rob-
ber) to establish a secure communication channel (group
communication).
Like other communication networks, security issues have
to be well-addressed. For example, message integrity must
be guaranteed, and the message senders should be authen-
ticated. Otherwise, an attacker can replace the safety mes-
sage from a vehicle or even impersonate a vehicle to trans-
mit a fake safety message which in turn can cause accidents
or even loss of life. In addition, user privacy concerns must
also be well mitigated, where the identity, the position, and
the trajectory of a specific vehicle should not be obtained
by a third party. Otherwise, one may not be willing to
use this new type of network. Thus an anonymous and
secure communication protocol is vital to VANET. Being
motivated by these, we propose an efficient HMAC-based
secure communication protocol in this paper. Although
all communications are broadcast in nature, we make uni-
cast communications possible in our one-to-one communi-
cations schemes by adopting cryptographic techniques such
as asymmetric encryption.
To ensure both identity authentication and message in-
tegrity in VANETs, encryption and digital signature in
conventional public key infrastructure (PKI) [9] is a well
accepted choice. One appealing solution is to sign and en-
crypt each message before the message is sent. However,
conventional signature and encryption schemes that de-
crypt and verify the received messages one after the other
may fail to satisfy the stringent time requirement of the
vehicular communication applications. And the computa-
tion power of an OBU is also not strong enough to handle
all verifications in a short time, especially in places where
the traffic density is high. Even they are done by RSUs,
note that an RSU could communicate with hundreds of
OBUs. In this case, dealing with a large number of mes-
sages sequentially could take a long time and will certainly
become the processing bottleneck at the RSUs. An effi-
cient method for dealing with plenty of messages within a
short period of time is desirable.
Hash-based Message Authentication Code (HMAC) [24],
is a mechanism for message authentication using crypto-
graphic hash functions. It can be used with any iterative
cryptographic hash function such as MD5 and SHA-1, in
combination with a secret shared key. As one kind of Mes-
sage Authentication Code (MAC), it provides a way for
checking the integrity of information transmitted over or
stored in an unreliable medium based on a secret key. El-
liptic curve cryptography (ECC) is an approach to public-
key cryptography based on the algebraic structure of el-
liptic curves over finite fields. The use of elliptic curves in
cryptography was suggested independently by Neal Koblitz
[25] and Victor S. Miller [26] in 1985. In public key cryp-
tography each user has a pair of keys: a public key and a
private key. Only the user knows the private key whereas
the public key is distributed to all other users. Unlike other
popular algorithms such as RSA, ECC is based on discrete
logarithms which is much more difficult to be cracked at
equivalent key lengths. Prior schemes mainly use the pair-
ing operation called bilinear map based on ECC for veri-
fication. Compared to pairing operation, HMAC is much
more effective. We have tested the pairing operation based
on an implementation using PBC library [23], its running
time is thousands of times longer than HMAC based on
sha-1. We will talk about the details in Section VI.A.
Related work: Many related studies have been re-
ported to address security and privacy preservation prob-
lems in VANETs [10 - 17]. To achieve both message au-
thentication and anonymity, Raya et al. in [10] proposed
that each vehicle should be pre-loaded with a large num-
ber of anonymous public and private key pairs and the
corresponding public key certificates. Freudiger et al. in
[11] addressed the problem of achieving location privacy
in VANETs with randomly changing identifiers. In par-
ticular, they proposed a protocol to create cryptographic
mix-zones at road intersections. They analyzed theoreti-
cally and by simulation the location privacy achieved by
combining mix-zones into mix-networks. In [12], Wen et
al. propose to use the physical property of a transmitting
signal to discriminate one transmitter from others because
physical measurement is more efficient than software com-
putation. Wasef and Shen [13], on the other hand, aims at
enhancing the efficiency of any certificate-based authenti-
cation scheme. They propose a HMAC-based solution to
replace the time-consuming and traditional certificate re-
vocation list checking process. Sun et al. in [14] introduced
a group signature scheme to sign each message. Some re-
cent works [15 - 17] also propose to achieve the goal by
using group signature schemes. That is, each vehicle in
the system is assigned a group private key. When a vehicle
wants to broadcast a message, it signs the message using
its group private key. Verifiers such as RSUs can then ver-
ify its signature using a common group public key. In this
way, a signature can be properly verified but at the same
time, the real identity of the signer can be hidden. Only if
necessary, a trusted party can use a private key to reveal
the real identity of the signer.
In [3], the IBV protocol was proposed for vehicle-to-RSU
communications. The RSU can verify a large number of
signatures as a batch using just three pairing operations.
However, their work has some limitations. First, their pro-
tocol relies heavily on a tamper-proof hardware device, in-
stalled in each vehicle, which preloads the system-wide se-
cret key. Once one of these devices is cracked, the whole
system will be compromised. Second, a vehicle’s real iden-
tity can be traced by anyone, thus the protocol does not
satisfy the privacy requirement. Third, their protocol has
a flaw such that a vehicle can use a fake identity to avoid
being traced (anti-traceability attack) or even impersonate
another vehicle (impersonation attack1). Forth, in their
batch verification scheme, if any of the signatures is erro-
neous, the whole batch will be dropped. This is inefficient
because most signatures in the batch may actually be valid,
thus may imply a not satisfactory successful rate. Finally,
the IBV protocol is not designed for vehicle-to-vehicle com-
munications.
In a more recent work [4], the RAISE protocol was pro-
posed for vehicle-to-vehicle communications. The protocol
is software-based. It allows a vehicle to verify the signa-
ture of another with the aid of a nearby RSU. However, no
batch verification can be done and the RSU has to verify
signatures one after another. On the other hand, to notify
other vehicles whether a message from a certain vehicle is
valid, a hash value of 128 bytes needs to be broadcasted.
There can be tens up to thousands of signatures within a
short period of time, thus the notification messages induce
a heavy message overhead.
Most recently in our prior work [1], we propose two Se-
cure and Privacy Enhancing Communications Schemes for
vehicular sensor networks. The schemes can handle ad hoc
messages (those sent out by arbitrary vehicles) as well as
allow vehicles that know one another in advance to form
a group and send group messages securely among them-
selves. The schemes are software-based and do not rely on
any special hardware. The schemes are also based on bilin-
ear pairing. By establishing shared secrets with RSU and
TA on the handshaking phase, a vehicle is allowed to use
a different pseudo identity for each session (or message) to
protect its privacy while the real identity is traceable only
by TA. We make use of the techniques of binary search in
RSU message verification phase and bloom filter to replace
hash values in notification messages to reduce the message
overhead substantially and enhance the effectiveness of the
verification phase. Any vehicle can form a group with other
vehicles after an initial handshaking with a nearby RSU
and then can authenticate and communicate with one an-
other securely without the intervention of RSU even after
moving into the region of another RSU. However, they use
pairing operation for the communication between RSUs
and vehicles. As pairing operation costs too much time as
we just mentioned, a simpler and more effective method is
required.
Several schemes about the group communications also
exist. In [18], the PPGCV protocol was proposed. In ad-
dition to a scheme for group formation, they provide a pro-
tocol to update the group key. However, the setting of their
scheme is different from a typical VANET and the key up-
date process relies heavily on a key server which holds the
set of all keys distributed to the vehicles. In [19], another
group communications protocol, SeGCom, was proposed.
However, the privacy is not considered. In our prior work
[2], we provide a more comprehensive set of group com-
munication schemes for VANETs, they support dynamic
membership in a group. When a new member wants to join
an existing group or an existing member wants to leave a
group, there is no need to form a new group from scratch.
The group secure key can be updated periodically without
any help from an RSU to increase the security level of the
communication. As an add-on service, members in a group
can choose to send a secure message to a dedicated member
in the group. To solve the noisy channel problem, they in-
clude simple acknowledgement messages in their schemes.
Similar to [1], we also use pairing operation for the one-to-
one communication between group members. This is not
effective too. Thus in this paper, we propose a simpler and
more effective solution.
In terms of secure VANET applications, Lu et al. [20]
proposes a secure navigation scheme for locating parking
lots in a car park while Popa et al. [21] proposes a se-
cure and privacy preserving road toll calculation scheme
under the principle of multi-party computation. In [5],
the authors propose a VANET-based Secure and Privacy-
preserving Navigation scheme which makes use of the col-
lected data to provide navigation service to drivers.
Our contributions In this paper, we propose a more
comprehensive set of schemes for VANETs. Our schemes
satisfy all security requirement (see Section II.B) for
VANETs and include the following three novel schemes:
(1)We use only simple HMAC checking and symmetric en-
cryption to replace the complicated Elliptic Curve Cryp-
tographic (ECC) approach to achieve secure communica-
tions between Vehicles and RSUs. This is very efficient
and can satisfy all the security requirements of VANETs.
(2)Without using the complicated ECC approach, we re-
alize the one-to-one secure communications scheme among
group members as in the DRS paper [2] by using simple
symmetric encryption and HMAC calculation based on a
shared key. (3)We define a one-to-one secure communica-
tions scheme among vehicles who do not know each other
in advance. There is no such scheme in all existing solu-
tions, and our scheme supplements this shortcoming.
Organization: The rest of the paper is organized as
follows: In Section II we present our assumption and the
security requirement. Some preliminaries are given in Sec-
tion III. We present our schemes in Section IV, the simu-
lation of our schemes are given in Section V, we conclude
our paper and discuss the future work in Section VI.
II. Assumption and Security Requirements
A. Assumptions
Recall that a vehicular network consists of on-board
units (OBUs) installed on vehicles, road-side units (RSUs)
along the roads, and a trusted authority (TA). We focus on
the inter-vehicle communications over the wireless channel.
We assume that:
1. The TA is always online and trusted by everyone.
RSUs and TA communicate through a secure fixed
network.
2. The RSUs have higher computation power than
OBUs.
3. The RSU-to-vehicle transmission (RVC) range is at
least twice of the inter-vehicle communication (IVC)
range to ensure that if an RSU receives a message, all
vehicles receiving the same message are in the feasible
range to receive the notification from the RSU.
4. There exists a conventional public key infrastructure
(PKI) for initial handshaking. The public key of the
TA PKTA is known by everyone. The public key of
vehicle Vi PKVi is known by the TA. Also any RSU
R broadcasts its public key PKR with hello messages
periodically to vehicles that are traveling in the RVC
range of it. Thus PKR is known by all vehicles nearby.
There is no need for vehicles to know the public keys of
other vehicles to avoid message overhead for exchang-
ing certificates. The private keys of TA, Vi and R
are SKTA, SKVi and SKR respectively and are kept
secret by the corresponding party. To increase the se-
curity level, the master key s that is picked by TA for
every vehicle is not preloaded into any hardware on
the vehicle like [3].
5. The real identity of any vehicle is only known by the
TA and itself but not by others.
B. Security Requirement
1. Message integrity and authentication: A vehicle
should be able to verify that a message is indeed sent
and signed by another vehicle (or a valid group mem-
ber) without being modified by anyone.
2. Identity privacy preservation: The real identity of a
vehicle should not be linked to any message so that
other vehicles or even RSUs cannot reveal a vehicle’s
real identity by analyzing multiple messages sent by
it.
3. Traceability: Although a vehicle’s real identity should
be hidden, if necessary, TA should have the ability to
obtain a vehicle’s real identity and relate the message
to the sender (for example, in case the real identity
of the sender of a fake message causing an accident
needs to be revealed).
4. Confidentiality: Group messages cannot be decrypted
by vehicles not in the group and a group message
sent to a dedicated member can only be readable by
the dedicated receiver, other vehicles (including other
members) cannot decrypt the message.
III. Preliminaries
Although in our scheme, we use the HMAC to verify in-
stead of using pairing operations, our security schemes are
still using two cyclic groups with mapping called bilinear
map. We first briefly introduce what a bilinear map is,
and then we introduce how our method uses HMAC for
signature verification.
A. Bilinear group
Let G be a cyclic additive group and GT be a cyclic mul-
tiplicative group. Both groups G and GT have the same
prime order q. The mapping eˆ : G×G → GT is called a
bilinear map if it satisfies the following properties: (1) Bi-
linear: ∀P,Q,R ∈ G and ∀a, b ∈ Z, eˆ(Q,P +R) = eˆ(P +
R,Q) = eˆ(P,Q) · eˆ(R,Q). Also eˆ(aP, bP ) = eˆ(P, bP )a =
eˆ(aP,P )b = eˆ(P,P )ab. (2) Non-degenerate: There exists
P,Q ∈G such that eˆ(P,Q) 6= 1GT . (3) Computable: There
exists an efficient algorithm to compute eˆ(P,Q) for any
P,Q ∈G.
The bilinear map eˆ can be constructed on elliptic curves.
Each operation for computing eˆ(P,Q) is a pairing opera-
tion. Pairing operation is the most expensive operation in
this kind of cryptographic schemes. The fewer the number
of pairing operations, the more efficient the scheme is. So
we replace it by HMAC technique. The groups G and GT
are called bilinear groups. The security of it relies on the
fact that the discrete logarithm problem (DLP) on bilin-
ear groups is computationally hard, i.e., given the point
Q = aP , there exists no efficient algorithm to obtain a.
The implication is that we can transfer Q in an open wire-
less channel without worrying that a (usually some secret)
can be known by the attackers.
B. Verification using HMAC
In our schemes, we use HMAC instead of pairing op-
eration to verify a message. Because the operation time
of HMAC is much shorter than that of pairing, it is very
efficient. Our idea is as follows:
We assume that two parties A and B have a shared secret
key t, and ENCt(M) and HMACt(M) are the symmetric
encryption and HMAC values of the message M using the
key t respectively. If A wants to send a message M to B,
it first computes ENCt(M) and HMACt(M), and sends
them to B, B decrypts ENCt(M) to get the message M ,
and then computes the HMAC value of the message M .
If the computed HMAC value is the same as the received
one, B accepts the message.
In the above method we mainly use a symmetric en-
cryption and a HMAC computation under a shared secret
key to protect the message. The operation of the sym-
metric encryption can protect the privacy of the message,
which makes the message not leaked, and only the per-
son that knows the shared secret key can get the message.
Because of the irreversible of the HMAC, only the per-
son that knows the message and the shared secret key can
compute the HMAC value, this protects the integrity of
the message and meanwhile it can satisfy the requirement
of verification. The only shortcoming is that we need to
build a shared secret key beforehand.
IV. Specifications
This section presents our new schemes. Note that our
schemes are based on the framework of [1] and [2]. There
are some initial parameters to be generated by TA using
the following steps. This needs to be done once for the
whole system unless the master key, or the real identity of
a vehicle is believed to be compromised, or TA wants to
update the parameters and the master key periodically to
enhance the security level of the system.
1) TA chooses G and GT that satisfy the bilinear map
properties.
2) TA randomly picks s ∈ Zq as its master key and com-
putes Ppub = sP as its public key. The public parameters
{G,GT ,q,P,Ppub} are publicly accessible by all RSUs and
vehicles.
3) TA assigns each vehicle a real identity RID ∈G and
a password PWD. The drivers are informed about them
during network deployment or during vehicle first registra-
tion.
The schemes can be divided into several modules, with
details given in the following subsections.
A. Initial handshaking
This module is executed when a vehicle meets a new
RSU. The vehicle authenticates itself with the TA via RSU.
TA will then pass information to RSU to allow RSU to
verify the vehicle’s signature even if it uses pseudo identity
to sign the message. Also, RSU will generate a shared
secret with the vehicle. If this is the first time the vehicle
authenticates itself with the TA, TA will pass the master
key s and a shared secret to the vehicle. This only needs to
be done once in the whole journey. To increase the security
level, s is not preloaded into any hardware on the vehicle
like [3]. For the shared secret with RSU, a new secret is
generated every time the vehicle moves into the region of
another RSU.
We use the notations CENCX(M), CDECX(M) and
CSIGX(M) to denote encrypting, decrypting and signing
respectively message M using key X under conventional
public key cryptographic system. The detailed processes
in this module are as follows:
1. When a vehicle Vi starts up or when it finds the first
RSU R after it starts up, it encrypts its RID and
PWD using the TA’s conventional public key CPKTA
and sends CENCCPKT A(RID,PWD) to the closest
RSU which in turn forwards it to the TA.
2. The TA verifies RID and PWD, and generates
two shared secrets: ti to be used between itself
and Vi; mi to be used between the connecting
RSU and Vi. It then computes Vi’s ID Verifi-
cation Public Key as V PKi = ti ⊕ RID . This
V PKi will be passed to the RSU to enable it to
verify signatures from Vi even if Vi uses pseudo
identity to sign the message. The TA stores the
(RID,ti,mi) tuple and forwards V PKi, mi and X =
CENCCPKVi (s,V PKi,mi,CSIGCSKTA(s,V PKi,mi))
to the RSU. Note that to let Vi know that s, V PKi
and mi are really sent by the TA, the TA includes
its signature CSIGCSKT A(s, V PKi, mi) into the
encrypted text.
3. The RSU stores the (V PKi,mi) pair into its verifi-
cation table for later usage. It then forwards X to
vehicle Vi.
4. Vehicle Vi decrypts X to obtain s, V PKi andmi and
verifies the TA’s signature on them. It then computes
its shared secret with the TA using t= V PKi⊕RID
and stores its shared secret mi with the RSU.
This basically completes the initial handshaking phase.
When vehicle Vi leaves the range of an RSU and enters the
range of another, it includes a simpler authentication pro-
cess with the TA. TA then generates a new shared secret
with Vi and passes necessary information to the new RSU
for verifying Vi ’s signature. For details, please refer to [2].
B. Communications between Vehicles and RSUs
If Vi wants to send and sign a message Mi to an RSU
nearby, the following verification procedures will be carried
out:
1. Vi first generates a pseudo identity. Different pseudo
identities are used for different messages to avoid being
traced. To generate a pseudo identity, Vi first gener-
ates a random nonce r, then its pseudo identity be-
comes: PIDi = (PIDi1,P IDi2) = (r×Ppub,V PKi⊕
H(miPIDi1)).
2. Vi sends < PIDi,ENCmi(Mi),HMACmi(Mi) > to
the RSU nearby.
3. Upon receiving the message, the RSU finds out Vi’s
verification public key V PKi and shared secret mi by
checking which of stored tuples (V PKi, mi) satisfies
the expression PIDi2 = V PKi⊕H(miPIDi1).
4. The RSU then decrypts ENCmi(Mi) and verifies
HMACmi(Mi) using mi. If they are valid, the verifi-
cation is considered to be successful.
In [1] and [2], an RSU verifies any vehicle’s signatures us-
ing a complicated ECC approach. However, in our scheme,
only HMAC checking is involved, and the previous asym-
metric encryption of message is simplified to symmetric
encryption in our scheme.
C. One to One Communications within a Group
We assume that vehicles V1, V2, ..., Vn have already
formed a group using the scheme in [1] and [2], and their
pseudo identities and group public keys are GID1, GID2,
...,GIDn and GPK1,GPK2, ...,GPKn respectively. Here
GPKi = miP . Also their shared secret key developed is
β = rr× s, here rr is generated by the RSU at the stage
of the group formation and distributed to all the group
members. The RSU does not know the value of s, So it
does not know the shared secret key β. Now let us see how
they can communicate with each other.
If Vi wants to send a messageMi to another group mem-
ber Vj , the following procedures will be carried out:
1. Vi sends < GIDi, GIDj , ENCβ×mi×GPKj (Mi),
HMACβ×mi×GPKj (Mi)> to Vj .
2. Vj verifies the message as follows. It first decrypts
ENCβ×mi×GPKj (Mi) using the key β ×mj ×GPKi
and obtainsMi. Then it verifies the HMAC signature
using the key β×mj×GPKi. If the computed HMAC
value is the same as the received one, Vj accepts the
message as a valid one. The above checking is valid
because β×mi×GPKj = β×mi×mjP = β×mj ×
miP = β×mj ×GPKi.
If later Vj wants to send a message Mj back
to Vi, it sends < GIDj , GIDi, ENCβ×mj×GPKi(Mj),
HMACβ×mj×GPKi(Mj) > to Vi. Vj verifies that message
as what Vi does previously using the key β×mi×GPKj.
Note that β (not known by RSU) is necessary to be part
of the shared key since otherwise, RSU will know how to
decrypt their conversations.
The DRS paper [2] also defines a one-to-one secure com-
munications scheme among group members. However,
the mechanism is based on a complicated ECC approach.
However, in this scheme, only simple symmetric encryption
based on an easily-derived shared key is involved.
D. One to One Communications without a Group
This subsection discusses a secure ad-hoc communica-
tions scheme among unknown vehicles. Consider the case
that a vehicle Vi wants to communicate with a nearby un-
known vehicle Vj . Assume that the pseudo identities of Vi
and Vj are PIDi = (PIDi1, PIDi2) = (r1 ×P , PIDi2)
and PIDj = (PIDj1, P IDj2) = (r2 × P, PIDj2) respec-
tively (i.e. same definition as in [1]). Then they can use the
shared secret key r1× r2 ×P (instead of β×mi×mj ×P
for the group scenario above) for secure communications.
We will discuss the details as follows:
If Vi wants to send a message Mi to Vj , the following
procedures will be carried out:
1. Vi sends to Vj < PIDi, P IDj , ENCr1×PIDj1 (Mi),
HMACr1×PIDj1 (Mi) >, where PIDi =
(r1 ×P,PIDi2) and PIDj = (r2 ×P,PIDj2).
2. Vj verifies the message as follows. It first decrypts
ENCr1×PIDj1(Mi) using the key r2×PIDi1 and ob-
tains Mi. Then it verifies the HMAC signature using
the key r2 ×PIDi1. If the computed HMAC value is
the same as the received one, Vj accepts the message
as a valid one. The above checking is valid because
r2 ×PIDi1 = r2 × r1P = r1 × r2P = r1×PIDi1.
All vehicles involved store their current pseudo identi-
ties so that they can use the same random nonce for ongo-
ing communications without the need of key change in the
middle.
The SPECS [1] and the DRS [2] does not define any
one-to-one secure communications scheme among vehicles
who do not know each other in advance. Thus this scheme
supplements their short-coming.
V. Security Analysis
We analyze our schemes with respect to the security re-
quirements listed in Section II.B.
Message integrity and authentication: In our
scheme, we use the packet of ENCmi(Mi) and
HMACmi(Mi) to realize the Message integrity and au-
thentication of message Mi, where mi is the shared secret
between two parties. Now we show that an attacker cannot
generate a valid signature.
We argue that if the shared secret key mi is kept secret,
then a vehicle’s message (either ad hoc message or group
message) cannot be forged by the attacker and our scheme
is secure against existential forgery, adaptive chosen mes-
sage attack under random oracle model. We first consider
the Game between a challenger and an attacker:
Setup: The challenger starts by giving the attacker a set
of system parameters.
Challenge: The challenger asks the attacker to pick one
random message Mi and sign it to produce ENCmi(Mi)
and HMACmi(Mi).
Guess: Finally, the attacker sends one pair ENCmi(Mi),
HMACmi(Mi) to the challenger.
The attacker’s advantage in this game is defined to be
Pr[ENCmi(Mi) and HMACmi(Mi) are valid signatures].
We say that our signature scheme is secure against exis-
tential forgery, adaptive chosen message attack if the at-
tacker’s advantage is negligible.
For the first scheme in Section IV.B, mi is the shared
secret between Vi and RSU. Due to the difficulty of solving
the discrete logarithm problem, only Vi and RSU knows
mi. For the second scheme in Section IV.C, we can see
that the secret key between Vi and Vj is β×mi×GPKj =
β×mi×mjP = β×mj ×miP = β×mj ×GPKi. Due to
the diffculty of solving the discrete logarithm problem and
β = rr× s is only known by vehicles, only Vi and Vj know
the shared secret key. Similarly to this, the third scheme
in Section IV.D can also protect the shared secret key.
But this scheme is for unknown vehicles to communicate
with each other, so we do not define any authentication
additional in our scheme.
From above we can see that the attacker can not obtain
the shared secret key, and we can regard the HMAC as
the random oracle, so we cannot forgery or differ any valid
message, and the attacker’s advantage is negligible, our
scheme is also security.
Identity privacy preservation: We show that an at-
tacker cannot obtain a vehicle’s real identity even it is keep-
ing its pseudo identity. We argue that if DDH is hard, then
the pseudo identity of a vehicle will not leak any informa-
tion of its real identity. we prove it as follows.
We first consider Game 1 between a challenger and an
attacker:
Setup: The challenger starts by giving the attacker a set
of system parameters including P and Ppub.
Choose: The attacker then freely chooses two verifica-
tion public keys V PK0 and V PK1 and sends them to the
challenger.
Challenge: The challenger sets a bit x = 0 with probabil-
ity 1/2 and sets x = 1 with probability 1/2. The challenger
then sends the attacker the pseudo identity corresponding
to V PKb together with the group public key.
Guess: The attacker tries to guess the value of x chosen
by the challenger, and outputs its guess, x0.
The attacker’s advantage in this game is defined to be
Pr[x = x0]−1/2. We say that our pseudo identity genera-
tion algorithm is semantically secure against a chosen plain
text attack (CPA) if the attacker’s advantage is negligible.
Next we assume that we have an algorithm A which runs
in polynomial time and has a non-negligible advantage e
as the attacker in Game 1. We will construct Game 2 in
which a Decisional DiffieCHellman (DDH) attacker B can
make use of A to achieve a non-negligible advantage in
breaking DDH. B is given a DDH instance (P,aP, bP,T )
as input and he is asked to determine whether T = abP .
We further let t denote a bit that B is trying to guess (i.e.
t= 0 for positive answer T = abP while t= 1 for negative
answer T − abP ). Game 2 runs as follows:
Setup: Based on the DDH instance, B makes up the
parameters (P,Ppub = aP ) and gives them to A. Note that
a now plays the role of s in our scheme.
Choose: A then chooses two verification public keys
V PK0 and V PK1 which it has queried for the correspond-
ing group public keys, m0P and m1P respectively, before
and sends them to B.
Challenge: B is playing the role of challenger here, so
it sets a bit x randomly and generates the pseudo iden-
tity PID = (PID1, P ID2), where PID1 = raP,PID2 =
V PKx⊕H(rabP ) and r is a random nonce and sends to
A. B also sends A the group public key bP . (Note that b
now plays the role of the RSU-vehicle shared secret mi in
our scheme.)
Guess: Finally A sends B a bit x0 as its guess for x. B
answers the DDH problem positively that T = abP if B’s
guess is correct (i.e. x = x0). Now let us look at why B
can answer the DDH problem in this way. If t = 0 (i.e.
T = abP ), then PID2 = V PKb ⊕H(−rabP ) = V PKb ⊕
H(bPID1) is a valid pseudo identity in proper format. In
this case, since A has non-negligible advantage in the game
described above, it is likely that A can break our system
and can guess x correctly with probability 1/2+ ε. Thus,
Pr[Bsucceeds|t = 0] = 1/2 + ε. If t = 1, we claim that
Pr[Bsucceeds|t = 1] = 1/2 only. To see why, we observe
that when T is randomly chosen, the term H(rT ) in PID2
cannot be cancelled by the term H(bPID1) and so there is
no way to obtain V PKx. Thus the computation reveals no
information about x. In this sense, the value of x is hidden
to A, so even A can break our system, the probability
that he will guess x correctly is simply 1/2 (by tossing a
fair coin). Hence, Pr[Bsucceeds] = 1/2× (1/2+ε)+1/2×
1/2 = 1/2 + ε/2. Since ε is non-negligible, B can solve
the DDH problem but this violates the assumption that
DDH is hard. Therefore, our scheme is secure in the sense
that the pseudo identity of a vehicle can preserve its real
identity.
Traceability: To reveal the real identity of the sender
of a message, TA is the only authorized party that can
perform the tracing. Given the pseudo identity PIDi of
the vehicle Vi and its shared secret with the connecting
RSU mi, TA can search through all the stored (RIDj , tj)
pairs from its repository. Vehicle Vi’ real identity is the
RIDj value from the entry that satisfies the expression
PIDi2 ⊕ tj ⊕H(miPIDi1) = RIDj . No other party can
obtain vehicle Vi’s real identity since ti is only known by
the TA and Vi itself. Upon getting Vi’s real identity RIDi,
TA can revoke it if necessary. This can be done by simply
storing RIDi into a revocation list. Vi can no longer obtain
V PKi from it in the future.
Confidentiality: For the first scheme in Section IV.B,
the message Mi is protected by the shared secret key mi,
the ciphertext under symmetric encryption cannot leak any
information about the message. Similarly for the schemes
in Section IV.C and IV.D, confidentiality is protected by
the shared secret key developed between the vehicles.
VI. Simulation Results
In this section, we show the simulation results for com-
paring our schemes with SPECS [1], DRS [2] and IBV [3].
Note that IBV also uses a batch verification scheme, so we
choose it as our comparison. We first compare our scheme
in Section IV.B with SPECS [1] and IBV [3] in terms of de-
lay. In [5], it finds that the pairing operation does not take
constant time, and so we consider both cases. In SPECS1,
we consider the pairing time as a constant and in SPECS2
we consider that the pairing time increases linearly as the
input parameters increases. Through simulation, we find
that since we do not rely on RSUs for the verification of
one-to-one messages, the delay caused by our scheme is
much shorter. We also compare our schemes in Section
IV.C and IV.D with the DRS [2] in terms of delay. We
find our schemes are more effective.
A. The simulation model
We implement our schemes, the SPECS schemes, IBV
and the DRS schemes on a simulator written in C++.
Some of the settings and parameters of our simulation are
adopted from [1 - 4]. We assume that there is a highway
of length 10 km. A number of RSUs are installed along
it. The number of RSUs is a variable and these RSUs are
evenly distributed along the highway. Groups of vehicles
are traveling on it at speeds varying from 50 km/h to 70
km/h (common cases in Hong Kong). For each group, the
number of vehicles is a variable and the vehicles are trav-
eling on the road one after another. The RSU-to-Vehicle
Communication (RVC) and the Inter-Vehicle Communica-
tion (IVC) ranges are set to 600 m and 300 m respectively,
i.e. when a vehicle enters the 600 m RVC range of the
RSU, the messages sent by the RSU can be received by
it. Two vehicles that are within the 300 m IVC range of
each other can communicate. Inter-vehicle messages are
sent every 500 ms at each vehicle. IEEE 802.11a is used to
simulate the medium access control layer. That is, when
a vehicle wants to transmit, it first detects whether the
channel is available. If another vehicle is transmitting, it
waits until that transmission is completed and then waits
for a random delay period before it begins to transmit. The
bandwidth of the channel is 6 Mb/s and the average length
of inter-vehicle message (not including the cryptographic
bits) is 200 bytes. The RSU performs batch verification
every 300 ms and each pairing operation is assumed to
take 6 ms while each HMAC operation is assumed to take
0.006 ms. We obtained these benchmark values based on
an implementation using the PBC library [23]. We set the
message size to 512 bits and we run the test for 500 times
to obtain an average value.
In the simulation of scheme in Section IV.B, our simu-
lation runs for 1000s. We first vary the total number of
vehicles that have ever entered RSU’s RVC range during
the simulation period from 200 to 1000 in steps of 200 to
simulate the impact of different traffic densities. We then
vary the inter-vehicle message signature error rate from
1% to 10% to interpret its impact on the performance of
our schemes. In the simulation of scheme in Section IV.C
and IV.D, our simulation runs for 3600s, and we consider
the time of group arrival interval as 60s. We vary the total
number of vehicles from 60 to 600 in steps of 60 to simulate
the impact of different traffic densities.
B. The simulation results
Based on the concept of RAISE [4] and SPECS [1], we
define the average delay of a message as:
Delay =
1
N
N∑
i=1
1
Mi
M∑
m=1
(Tmverf − T
m
recv)
where Mi is the number of messages received by vehicle
Vi, T
m
recv is the time that vehicle Vi receives the verification
notification message of messagem from the RSU and Tmverf
is the time that vehicle Vi receives message m from its
neighboring vehicle.
Note that In RAISE [4], it defines the average message
loss ratio (LR) to express the success rate of the message,
and in SPECS [1], it processes the messages with batch
verification and deal with the invalid batch with the bloom
filter, so it extends LR to IBSR to express the success
rate for messages that are included in batches with invalid
signatures. It defines as follows:
SuccessRate =
1
N
N∑
i=1
(
M iapp
M imac
)
whereM iapp represents the total number of messages that
are successfully verified by the RSU and are consumed by
vehicle i in the application layer before vehicle i leaves
RSU’s IVC range. Also the signatures of these messages
are batch-processed with at least one invalid signature by
the RSU. M imac, on the other hand, represents the total
number of messages received by both vehicle i and RSU
in the medium access control layer from other vehicles and
again the signatures of these messages are being batch-
processed with at least one invalid signature by the RSU.
However, in our schemes, instead of the patch-processing
we deal with the messages one by one, and the receiver
must be able to verify every message, so we do not have the
concept of IBSR, and to compare with them is meaningless.
We divided our simulation into the next 4 experiments:
B.1 Experiment 1
In this experiment, we simulate the delay under the
schemes we discussed in Section IV.B(Communications be-
tween Vehicles and RSUs), Our simulation runs for 1000
s. We vary the number of vehicles from 200 to 1000 in
steps of 200, and we fix the error rate to 5%. To express
it clearly we divided the results into Figure 1 and Figure
2. In this experiment, we use “SPECSi-BSx” to denote
the schemes of SPECS that have different levels of binary
search as mentioned in SPECS [1]. In SPECS1 and IBV1,
we consider the pairing time as a const, and in SPECS2 and
IBV2 we consider that the pairing time increases linearly
as the input parameters increase. And we use “Scheme1”
in this experiment to denote our scheme.
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From this experiment we can see that the delay under
the IBV protocol and the SPECS schemes are very close
to each other, and in our scheme we deal with the message
one by one, so the delay caused by our scheme is almost
not changed, and the average delay caused by our scheme
is only 1.6×10−5 s, and no matter whether we consider the
pairing time as const or it increases linearly as the input
parameters increase, the delay caused by our schemes is
much lower than SPECS and IBV. In figure 1 we consider
the pairing time as const and the delay is at least 1.2×10−2
s, and in figure 2 we consider the pairing time increases
linearly as the input parameters increase and the delay
is at least 5× 10−2 s. So the average delay caused by
our scheme is nearly thousands of times lower than prior
schemes.
B.2 Experiment 2
The only difference between this experiment and Exper-
iment 1 is that we vary the error rate from 1% to 10% in
steps of 1%, and we fix the number of vehicles to 1000.
The simulation result is shown in Figure 3 and Figure 4.
Similarly to experiment 1 the average delay caused by our
scheme is only 1.6× 10−5 s, and no matter whether we
consider the pairing time as const or it increases linearly
as the input parameters increase, the delay caused by our
schemes is much lower than SPECS and IBV. In figure 3 we
consider the pairing time as const and the delay is at least
1.2× 10−2 s, and in figure 2 we consider the pairing time
increases linearly as the input parameters increase and the
delay is at least 1.7× 10−1 s. So the average delay caused
by our scheme is much lower than prior schemes.
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B.3 Experiment 3
In this experiment, we simulate the delay of our scheme
discussed in Section IV.C(One-to-One Communications
within a Group). Our simulation runs for 3600s and we
set the group arrival interval as 60s. We vary the number
of vehicles from 60 to 600 in steps of 60. Then we get the
results as in Table I.
TABLE I
delay vs. number of vehicles
NO. of Vehicles AD of DRS AD of Scheme2
60 0.0123 s 0.000312 s
120 0.0123 s 0.000312 s
180 0.0123 s 0.000312 s
240 0.0123 s 0.000312 s
300 0.0123 s 0.000312 s
360 0.0123 s 0.000312 s
420 0.0123 s 0.000312 s
480 0.0123 s 0.000312 s
540 0.0123 s 0.000312 s
600 0.0123 s 0.000312 s
In Table I, we use “AD of DRS” to denote the average
delay of the schemes of DRS [2] and “AD of Scheme2”
to denote the average delay of our scheme discussed in
Section IV.C. We only consider the one-to-one communi-
cation. From our experiment we can see that the average
delay caused by our scheme is only 0.000312 s, and the
average delay caused by DRS [2] is 0.0123 s. Thus our
scheme is much better.
B.4 Experiment 4
In this experiment, we simulate the delay of our scheme
discussed in Section IV.D(One-to-One Communications
without a Group). Our simulation runs for 3600s and we
set the group arrival interval as 60s, We vary the number
of vehicles from 60 to 600 in steps of 60. Then we get the
results in Table II.
TABLE II
delay vs. number of vehicles
NO. of Vehicles AD of DRS AD of Scheme3
60 9.00081 s 0.000312 s
120 9.00081 s 0.000312 s
180 9.00081 s 0.000312 s
240 9.00081 s 0.000312 s
300 9.00081 s 0.000312 s
360 9.00081 s 0.000312 s
420 9.00081 s 0.000312 s
480 9.00081 s 0.000312 s
540 9.00081 s 0.000312 s
600 9.00081 s 0.000312 s
In Table II, we use “AD of DRS” to denote the average
delay of schemes of DRS [2] and use “AD of Scheme3” to
denote the average delay of our scheme in Section IV.D. We
only consider the one-to-one communication. Our scheme
does not include the formation of a group, and the delay
of DRS is composed of the delay for group formation and
that for one-to-one communication. From our experiment
we can see that the average delay caused by our scheme is
only 0.000312 s, and the average delay caused by DRS [2]
is 9.00081 s. Thus our scheme is much better.
VII. Conclusions and Future Work
In this paper, we propose a more comprehensive set of
schemes for VANETs. Our schemes satisfy all security re-
quirement for VANETs and is more efficient than exist-
ing solutions. We use only HMAC checking and symmet-
ric encryption to replace the complicated Elliptic Curve
Cryptographic (ECC) approach to achieve secure commu-
nications between vehicles and RSUs. Compared to using
the complicated ECC approach to realize one-to-one secure
communications among group members as in DRS [2], we
achieve this only using simple symmetric encryption and
HMAC calculation based on a shared key. We also define a
one-to-one secure communications scheme among vehicles
who do not know each other in advance, which fill in the
gaps of previous schemes.
In SPECS, a number of message exchanges between ve-
hicles and an RSU are involved when they want to form a
group. Now any two vehicles have a shared secret. In the
future, we will investigate the possibility of simplifying the
group formation procedures involved. Also we will take
into consideration the impact of hidden terminal problem
and different values for group arrival interval.
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